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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cash transfers to families with children are being restricted increasingly
to parents who work, while families of nonworking parents are receiv-
ing a progressively larger share of their benefits in kind. This paper
provides an evaluation of the empirical evidence regarding the effects of
in-kind and cash-transfer programs on the children who are their in-
tended beneficiaries. A distinction is made between in-kind transfer pro-
grams, such as the Food Stamp Program, which provide transfers to
families that are earmarked for certain purposes, and programs such as
Medicaid that provide specific services directly to children. Although the
evidence is incomplete, it suggests that in-kind programs have stronger
effects on children than cash transfers, and that programs that target
specific benefits directly to children have the largest positive effects.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the public identifies the term welfare with cash transfers to
single mothers under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram (AFDC), cash transfers are being restricted increasingly to parents
who work. The nonworking poor are receiving a progressively larger
share of their benefits in kind (Moffitt, 1992). In a world in which govern-
ments could always identify the intended beneficiaries, and issuesof
intra-household resource allocation did not arise, in-kind transfers to
poor families would be an inefficient way to increase thewell-being of
poor children. The "first-best" solution would be to allowfamilies on
welfare to choose the basket of goods that best suited their needs.
In reality, it is necessary to design welfare programs that discourage
those outside the targeted population from applying. Nichols and
Zeckhauser (1982) show that if governments can identify goods that are
valued more highly by the deserving poor than by potential "impos-
ters," then providing these benefits in kind is a more efficient way to
transfer resources than providing cash, because fewer resources will be
directed to imposters. Besley and Coate (1992) provide a similar analysis
of requirements that welfare participants work. These papers provide a
theoretical justification for restrictions on cash welfare and for the grow-
ing emphasis on in-kind transfers. The literature on intra-household
resource allocation further suggests that policy makersshould be con-
cerned with how resources are utilized within the family.1
This paper provides an evaluation of the empirical evidence regarding
the effects of eight large federal cash and in-kind transfer programs on
the children who are their intended beneficiaries. It is convenient to
divide in-kind transfers into two groups: those that provide transfers to
the families of poor children that are earmarked for certain purposes
(e.g., food stamps), and those that provide specific services directly to
children (e.g., Medicaid). The evidence reviewed here suggests that in-
kind programs have stronger effects on children than cash transfers, and
that the more narrowly targeted the program, the larger the effects.
The second section of the paper provides an overview of the major
federal welfare programs that benefit children and documents the trends
toward in-kind benefits and toward restrictions on cash transfers. Mea-
sures of child well-being are also discussed. The third sectiondiscusses
the evidence regarding the effects of cash transfers on children. Section 4
analyzes in-kind transfers and discusses the relative efficacy of ear-
I For example, Thomas (1993) discusses the effects of allocating resources to mothers
rather than to fathers.\ \' - \ '
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FIGURE 1. Federal Welfare Expenditures.
Note: The bulge in outlays in 1985 is caused by a change in the method of financing public
housing, which generated close to $14 billion in one-time expenditures. The costs of capital
expenditures and modernization activities undertaken between 1974 and 1985 were paid
off in one lump sum rather than having payments spread over periods up to forty years.
Because of this one-time expenditure, future outlays for public housing will be lower than
they otherwise would have been.
marked versus more narrowly targeted programs. Conclusions appear
in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 An Overview of the Federal Welfare System2
Figure 1 shows the evolution of federal expenditures on the eight largest
welfare programs benefiting children. Administrative costs are excluded
whenever possible, as are state matching contributions for AFDC and
Medicaid. Expenditures (in real 1990 dollars) have been divided into cash
transfers and two types of in-kind transfers: "earmarked" programs in-
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FIGURE 2. Federal Welfare Expenditures.
Note: The bulge in outlays in 1985 is caused by a change in the method of financing public
housing, which generated close to $14 billion in one-time expenditures. The costs of capital
expenditures and modernization activities undertaken between 1974 and 1985 were paid
off in one lump sum rather than having payments spread over periods up to forty years.
Because of this one-time expenditure, future outlays for public housing will be lower than
they otherwise would have been.
dude food stamps and housing assistance; "targeted" programs include
Medicaid, Head Start, the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), and
the Special Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants, and Chil-
dren (WIG). The figure shows the remarkable increase in in-kind benefits
relative to cash benefits: though cash transfers grew only 18 percent be-
tween 1975 and 1990, in-kind transfers shot up 51 percent. Earmarked
programs make up the bulk of expenditures on in-kind programs, but the
two types of in-kind programs have shown roughly equal growth over
time.3
Figure 2 provides a more detailed breakdown of the evolution of ex-
It is interesting to compare these outlays on children to federal expenditures on the
elderly. In 1990, the federal government spent $1,020 per child under eighteen compared
to $11,350 per elderly person (U.S. House of Representatives, 1992). The largest compo-
nent of spending on the elderly was Social Security, which came to $193 billion.aThese figures were taken from U.S. House of Representatives (1992), pages 654, 1019, 1616, 1651, 1680,
1684, 1689, and 1695.
bThe figure for 1975 includes administrative costs; the figures for 1980 and 1990 do not.
These figures are for 1981.
dThese figures are for 1977.
penditures in each of the three categories, and Table 1 gives the amounts
spent in 1975, 1980, and 1990. Table 2 provides information about
caseloads in these three years. The rest of this section provides back-
ground information about the programs described in these tables.
2.1.1 Cash Transfers As shown in Figure 2 and Table 1, cash transfers
can be divided into expenditures on AFDC and outlays under the
Earned Income Tax Credit. AFDC was originally authorized under the
Social Security Act of 1935 as a federal-state matching entitlement pro-
gram that would provide assistance to fatherless children.4 As of Octo-
The fact that it is an entitlement program means that anyone who meets the eligibility
criteria is entitled to receive benefits.
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TABLE 1.
Trends in Program Expenditures (Billions of 1990 Dollars)a
Program 1975 1980 1990
Cash Transfers
AFDC
Total 20.4 19.0 18.5
Federal only 11.2 10.2 10.1
Earned income tax credit
Total 3.2 3.2 6.9
Refunded portion of credit 2.2 2.2 5.3
Earmarked Transfers
Food stamps 10.2b 13.8 15.1
Housing assistance 6.3d 8.6 10.6
Targeted Transfers
Medicaid
Total 30.6 40.9 72.5
Federal only 17.2 23.2 41.1
To dependent children 5.4 5.1 9.1
To adults in families with
dependent children
5.1 55c 8.6
WIC 0.6' 0.7 2.1
School Lunch 45d 4.8 3.7
Head Start 1.0 1.1 1.66Currie
TABLE 2.
Caseloads for Eight Large Federal Programs (Millions).
aThese figures are for 1977.
ber 1, 1990, states are also required to offer an AFDC Unemployed
Parent (AFDC-UP) program to two-parent families in which the princi-
ple earner is unemployed.5
AFDC is administered at the state level within federal guidelines-
states choose the need and payment standards that determine eligibility,
set income and asset limits, and choose benefit levels. As a result, pro-
gram characteristics vary widely from state to state. For example, as of
January 1991, the maximum monthly AFDC grant for a one-parent fam-
ily of four persons varied from $124 in Alabama to $891 in Alaska. By
way of comparison, the federal poverty line for a family of four persons
was $13,942. On average the federal government pays 54 percent of
benefit costs, as shown in Table 1.
Figure 2 shows that expenditures on the AFDC program have been
Only 5 percent of AFDC families qualified under this program in 1990.
Program 1975 1980 1990
Cash Transfers
AFDC
Total recipients 11.1 10.6 11.2
Child recipients 8.0 7.3 7.6










Total recipients 22.0 21.6 25.3
Child recipients 9.6 9.3 11.2
WIC
Number of women .2a .4 1.0
Number of infants .2 .5 1.4
Number of children .5 1.0 2.1
School Lunch
Number with any meals 26.3a 26.6 12.8
Number with free meals 10.5 10.0 10.3
Head Start 0.4 0.4 0.6Welfare and the Well-Being of Children7
declining gradually over time. In view of the fact that the maximum
AFDC benefit for a family of four in the median state fell by 33 percent
between 1975 and 1990, it is remarkable that total expenditures have not
fallen further. Since two, two-person families are more expensive thana
single four-person family, these figures may reflect a shift in the composi-
tion of the caseload toward smaller families.
Table 1 shows that the slack in AFDC growth has been takenup by
growth in expenditures on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which
doubled between 1975 and 1990. Table 2 shows that the growth in expen-
ditures was accompanied by a doubling of the caseload over thesame
period. The EITC was introduced in 1975 as a means of granting tax
relief to low-income taxpayers. In 1992, the maximum EITC was $1,324
for taxpayers with one qualifying child and $1,384 for taxpayers withany
additional qualifying children. The EITC begins to be phased out for
taxpayers with adjusted gross income (AGI) above $11,840 and is com-
pletely phased out for taxpayers with AGI greater than $22,370.
Because it is administered through the tax system, the EITC is not
usually viewed as a welfare program. However, unlike most tax credits,
the EITC is "refundable," that is, if the amount of the credit exceeds the
taxpayer's federal income tax liability, then the difference is refunded.
Table 1 shows that in fact most EITC expenditures were outlays of this
kind rather than foregone tax dollars. The EITC differs from traditional
cash welfare programs primarily because the majority of recipients
work, and benefits are available to all kinds of families.
2.1.2 Earmarked Programs As discussed above, expenditures on ear-
marked programs can be divided into expenditures on the Food Stamp
Program (FSP) and outlays for housing assistance. The Food Stamp Pro-
gram grew out of efforts to transfer surplus agricultural commodities to
the needy during the Great Depression. These programs had been formal-
ized and extended to all counties by 1973 (Clarkson, 1975). Food stamps
are issued in the form of booklets of coupons that may be used to purchase
all foods except alcohol, tobacco, and hot foods "intended for immediate
consumption." In contrast to AFDC, food stamps are available to all fami-
lies who meet federally determined income-eligibility requirements,
though AFDC recipients are automatically eligible. Interactions between
the FSP and AFDC provide the only source of state-to-state variation in
food stamp benefitsFSP income is reduced by $.30 for every dollar of
countable income (including AFDC benefits), once certain disregards are
applied.6
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Source: U.S. House of Representatives (1992)
FIGURE 3. Maximum Combined AFDC and Food Stamp Benefit As a
Percentage of Poverty.
Table 1 indicates that expenditures on the Food Stamp Program grew
by 50 percent between 1975 and 1990, whereas Table 2 shows that
caseloads rose only 25 percent. Hence, the increased generosity of food
stamp benefits made up part of the loss in cash transfers for AFDC
households. However, Figure 3 illustrates the fact that in 1992, even
combined AFDC and food stamp benefits were not high enough to bring
families up to the poverty level in most states.
Housing assistance has been provided since 1937 under the auspices
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). In con-
trast to AFDC and food stamps, housing assistance is not an entitlement:
when funds allocated to the program run out, people who are eligible
must be placed on a waiting list. It is estimated that about half of federal
expenditures on housing assistance directly benefits children and that
the elderly are the other large group of beneficiaries. The federal govern-
ment offers mortgage assistance to low-income rural households, but
most expenditures are on rental assistance programs.
The major forms of rental assistance are: 1) low-rent public housing, 2)
Section 8 new construction/substantial rehabilitation, and 3) Section 8
existing housing. Low-rent public housing is what most people think of
as "public housing." The Section 8 programs were established by the
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Under the new
construction/rehabilitation part of the program, the federal government
subsidizes the rents of apartments brought into the stock by privateWelfare and the Well-Being of Children9
developers. The Section 8 existing housing program provides rent subsi-
dies to families who find an apartment of their own choosing, as long as
the rent is below the "Fair Market Rent" established by HUD, and the
unit meets minimum quality standards. Rental assistance typically re-
duces a family's rental payments to 30 percent of its income, after deduc-
tions for certain expenses are taken into account.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that since 1982, over two
thirds of new authorizations for rental housing assistance were for Sec-
tion 8 programs (Pedone, 1988). The main rationale for this shift in
policy is that it is cheaper to house a family in an existing unit under a
voucher program than it is to build new public housing units (Apgar,
1990). Hence, more families can be served for the same budget outlay.
Tables 1 and 2 show that both outlays on housing assistance and the
caseload grew by roughly 66 percent between 1975 and 1990.
2.1.3 Services Targeted Directly to ChildrenFinally, turning to services
targeted directly to children, Figure 2 indicates that the largest program of
this kind is Medicaid, which provides health insurance to eligible poor
families and to the aged, blind, and disabled. It was created in 1966 as a
federal-state matching entitlement with the stated goal of eliminating
financial barriers to medical care. Table 1 shows that expenditures on
children account for a relatively small share of total Medicaid expendi-
tures: the average expenditure on an AFDC child is $682 compared to
$5928 for an aged person and $1290 for an AFDC adult (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1991). Notwithstanding children's relatively small share
of Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid is the single most important health
insurance program for poor children, accounting for over 55 percent of
public expenditures on child health.
States are required to offer Medicaid coverage to AFDC recipients and
to AFDC-UP families, and until recent extensions of coverage to other
groups, there was a very close linkage between AFDC recipiency and
Medicaid eligibility. However, evidence that many children and preg-
nant women were not receiving adequate preventive care led Congress
to begin extending Medicaid coverage for pregnant women and children
in 1984. States are now required to cover all pregnant women and chil-
dren under six with family income less than 133 percent of the federal
poverty line, regardless of family structure.7 As of July 1, 1991, states
were also required to cover all children born after September 30, 1983,
whose family incomes were less than 100 percent of the federal poverty
line.
The coverage of pregnant women is limited to services related to the pregnancy.10Currie
Tables 1 and 2 show that expenditures on children under the Medicaid
program have risen dramatically since 1975, in spite of the slow growth
in caseloads. This increase in Medicaid costs reflects an increase in the
cost per visit that is also occurring in the non-Medicaid population (New-
house, 1992). The relatively stagnant caseload may reflect low take-up
rates among newly eligible children.
Other large programs that target services directly to children include
school nutrition programs, WIC, and Head Start.8 Figure 2 indicates that
relative to the growth in expenditures on earmarked programs and on
Medicaid, there has been only modest growth in these three targeted
programs: total expenditures on the National School Lunch Program,
WIC, and Head Start increased only 20 percent between 1975 and 1990.
However, Table 1 shows that this aggregate masks considerable varia-
tion in individual program trends. For example, expenditures on WIC
tripled, while outlays on Head Start grew 60 percent, and expenditures
on the NSLP actually fell 18 percent.
The federal government supports seven programs that provide meals
or monthly food supplements to low-income children. The largest are
the NSLP, the School Breakfast Program (SBP), and WIC. The NSLP and
SBP are entitlements that operate by reimbursing schools for each meal
served. WIC is funded by appropriation, and the size of each year's
appropriation limits the number of people that can be served.
The NSLP was begun in 1946 in response to national concern about
the fact that one third of World War II draftees suffered nutrition-related
deficiencies that made them unfit for service. The NSLP is by far the
largest of the child nutrition programs: in 1981, lunches were served to
approximately 25 million students in 98 percent of the public schools
enough to feed 60 percent of all students attending public schools
(Radzikowski and Gale, 1984b). However, Table 2 shows that the total
number of children served fell more than 50 percent by 1990. School
lunches are provided free to children with family incomes less than 130
percent of the federal poverty line, and are subsidized if the family
income falls between 130 and 185 percent of the poverty line. Table 2
shows that the number of children receiving free lunches has remained
relatively constant over time at about ten million, while the number
receiving reduced-price meals declined 50 percent between 1975 and
1990, from twenty-seven to thirteen million.
The School Breakfast Program was instituted in 1966. It serves far
fewer children than the lunch program: in 1981, about four million break-
fasts were served in 33,000 schools, enough to feed about 10 percent of
8See Jones (1990, 1992) for further information about school nutrition programs and WIC.Welfare and the Well-Being of Children11
the public school student body.9 Participants in the SBP tend to be
poorer than participants in the NSLPwith the result that the majority
of school breakfasts have always been served free.
The WIC program provides nutritional counseling and food supple-
ments to pregnant and lactating mothers and their infants as well as to
low-income children up to age five. It is currently operated out of some
8,330 sites. The law requires that the WIC program provide foods con-
taining protein, iron, calcium, vitamin A, and vitamin C. Food packages
must be appropriately tailored to meet the needs of each category of
recipient.1° In fiscal year 1991, the average monthly WIC package was
valued at $31.67.
WIC participants must have family incomes less than 185 percent of
the poverty line (though states may set income thresholds as low as 100
percent of the poverty line) and must be certified as nutritionally "at
11 Participants must be recertified at intervals in order to continue
in the program. Table 2 indicates that the WIC caseload shot up 400
percent between 1975 and 1990, far outstripping the increase in expendi-
tures discussed above. WIC currently serves an estimated 60 percent of
those eligible. According to the Congressional Budget Office, it would
have cost $3.75 billion, or 44 percent more than that year's appropria-
tion, to serve all those who were eligible in 1992.
Head Start is a federal-local, matching grant program that aims to
improve the learning skills, social skills, and health status of poor chil-
dren so that they can begin schooling on an equal footing with their
more advantaged peers. Federal guidelines require that 90 percent of the
children served be from families with incomes below the federal poverty
line. Given that there are over 1,300 Head Start programs (Hayes et al.,
1990), all administered at a local level, there is a great deal of variation in
program content.
Begun in 1964 as part of President Johnson's "War on Poverty," Head
Start is one element of that program that has enjoyed great public and
bipartisan support. Former President Bush and President Clinton both
pledged to increase federal funding to serve all eligible children. In 1992,
622,000 children, roughly 28 percent of eligible three to five year olds,
were served at a cost of $2.2 billion (Stewart, 1992). Table 2 shows that
These numbers have remained relatively constant over time.
10The categories are children zero to three months of age, four to twelve months, women
and children with special dietary needs, children from one to five, pregnant and nursing
mothers, and postpartum non-nursing mothers.
10Evaluation of WIC is complicated by the fact that providers do not use uniform criteria
for certifying nutritional risk.12Currie
this represents an increase in the caseload of 69 percent between 1975
and 1990.
In summary, cash transfers are being restricted increasingly to parents
who work. Parents who do not work are receiving an increasing propor-
tion of their assistance in the form of in-kind benefits. Only a relatively
small share of these benefits, however, are in the form of specific ser-
vices provided directly to children. The lion's share goes to families in
the form of certificates that must be spent on food or housing.
2.2 Measures of Child Well-Being
Despite the fact that the programs discussed above are designed to
benefit children, remarkably little research has gone into assessing the
direct effects on child well-being. Much of the difficulty lies in finding
data sets with information about both welfare participation and child
outcomes. Ideally, one would like to examine a range of outcomes since
the effects of participation are likely to be complex. For example, while
Medicaid participation might be expected to improve a child's health, it
may also have positive effects on schooling attainment if poor health
would tend to impair a child's performance. This section describes the
three classes of outcomes that are the focus of this review: measures of
health, measures of cognition and schooling attainment, and measures
of long-run social competence.
2.2.1 Measures of Health StatusInfant and child mortality rates are
perhaps the most objective and least controversial measures of chil-
dren's health status. The infant mortality rate is defined as the number
of babies born alive who die before reaching age one. At 10 per 1,000, the
U.S. infant mortality rate is higher than that of any other industrialized
country, and African-American rates are twice as high as white rates
(Danzinger and Stern, 1990). A closely related measure of infant health is
birth weight. In 1980, infants less than 2,500 grams accounted for less
than 7 percent of all births, but 60 percent of infant deaths (U.S. House
of Representatives, 1992). Gestational age is also used as a measure of
neonatal health, but is subject to a great deal more measurement error
than birth weight.
Height-for-age is an anthropometric measure of the health and nutri-
tional status of older children (for babies the equivalent measure is
length-for-age). Physical anthropologists have concluded that ethnic dif-
ferentials in these measures are relatively minor for young children,
although they become more important after puberty. Because growth
varies systematically with age and gender, heights are usually standard-ized using guidelines from the National Center for Health Statistics.12
The incidence of low height-for-age (stunting) is much greater among
poor than among nonpoor children. For example, a 1983 study carried
out by the Massachusetts Department of Health found that 9.8 percent
of preschool children in Massachusetts had a height-for-age below the
fifth percentile of the NCHS standards (Massachusetts Department of
Health, 1983).
Nutritional status can also be assessed using information about the
nutrients available in a family's usual diet, individual nutrient intakes, or
biochemical tests. Low-income American children are at risk of iron and
zinc deficiencies and often lack vitamin C. For example, Devaney,
Haines, and Moffitt (1989) found that 20.6 percent of one- to two-year-
old children in low-income households suffered iron anemia compared
to 6.7 percent of one- to two-year-olds from higher income households.
These deficiencies have been linked to growth retardation, lethargy,
impaired immune status, and learning problems.
A third class of measures deals with the child's utilization of medical
services. Measures such as the number of doctor visits for illness are
problematic since they are affected both by illness and by the propensity
to utilize care. Visits for preventive care provide clearer measures of
utilization. Prenatal care is an important type of preventive care. When
adequate in terms of timely initiation and total number of visits, it can
significantly reduce the risk of low birth weight and infant mortality
(Institute of Medicine, 1985).
2.2.2 Test Scores and Schooling Attainment Academic achievement is a
crucial determinant of a child's success in our society: each additional
year of high school is estimated to raise future wages by as much as 8
percent.13 It is not surprising, then, that many tests of academic achieve-
ment have been developed. These tests are controversial: African Ameri-
cans obtain poorer scores than whites, and depending on the test, girls
sometimes outperform boys or vice versa. Ultimately, after controlling
for measures of background, it is not clear that these tests are good
predictors of a child's academic success at all. More direct indications of
academic attainment include whether the child has ever taken remedial
courses or failed to advance in grade. There is a great deal of evidence
which suggests that children who lag behind their peers even at early
ages are at higher risk of eventually dropping out of high school (Ens-
minger and Slusarcick, 1992).
12See Currie and Thomas (1993b) for further details.
13See Angrist (1990) for a recent estimate.
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2.2.3 Longer-Term Measures The ultimate measure of a welfare pro-
gram's success is the long-run situation of children whose families
participated. Are they less likely to become pregnant as teenagers, to
be unemployed, or ultimately to have their own children participate in
welfare programs? It has proven extremely difficult to answer this ques-
tion because it is hard to sort out the effects of welfare participation
from the effects of family background and community characteristics.
3. DO CASH TRANSFERS BENEFIT CHILDREN?
3.1 Effects of AFDC
Most research about the effects of AFDC on children focuses on the
question of whether daughters of women who participate in AFDC are
themselves more likely to participate (cf. Gottschalk, 1990). Critics of the
welfare system point to the intergenerational transmission of welfare
dependency as evidence that parental welfare participation actually
harms poor children by affecting their aspirations (cf. Murray, 1984).
However, this argument overlooks the fact that women whose mothers
were on AFDC are more likely than other women to be on AFDC simply
because the children of the poor are more likely to be poor.
Zimmerman and Levine (1993) test the hypothesis that AFDC has no
additional negative effect using data from the original National Longitu-
dinal Surveys and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. They
regress the daughter's participation in AFDC on measures of maternal
participation, maternal income, and other background variables. Since
both maternal AFDC participation and income are to some extent
choices and may be measured with error, they propose the following
instrumental variables (IV) technique: instrument AFDC participation
using maximum benefit levels in each state and instrument income using
the Duncan index of the mother's and father's occupations.14 They find
that maternal AFDC participation has no statistically significant effect on
the daughter's probability of participation, once maternal income is con-
trolled for.
This IV scheme implicitly assumes that women do not migrate in
response to AFDC benefits and that occupational choices are predeter-
mined to a greater extent than incomes are. The first assumption is
reasonable in light of empirical evidence that migration flows in re-
sponse to benefit levels are very small (Moffitt, 1992). The second is
perhaps less defensible. Still, Zimmerman and Levine's paper is the first
14 The Duncan index is a linear combination of the median earnings and education associ-
ated with an individual's occupation.Welfare and the Well-Being of Children15
to attempt to instrument both participation and income in a reasonable
way, and it suggests that poverty, not maternal welfare receipt, creates
welfare mothers.
These results suggest that maternal welfare participation does not
encourage teenage pregnancy and child-bearing.15 Although the teen
birthrate has fallen over time (from 90 births per 1,000 in 1955 to 54 per
1,000 in 1988), out-of-wedlock births to teenagers increased from 15.1 to
37 per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19 over the same period (U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, various years). The fact that the
rate of out-of-wedlock pregnancy has increased while the AFDC benefit
level has continued to fall also indicates that there is no simple relation-
ship between the two. Studies that have examined this question directly
reach the same conclusion. For example, neither Moore and Caldwell
(1977) nor Eliwood and Bane (1985) were able to find any consistent
effect of state benefit levels on the probability of a teen pregnancy. 16
There has been comparatively little research linking maternal AFDC
participation to other child outcomes, but the empirical issues are the
same. First, it is necessary to control for some measure of income as well
as for AFDC status; otherwise the estimated effects of participation are
likely to reflect the relative poverty of AFDC mothers. Second, within
the group of poor women, one would like to control for the endogeneity
of AFDC status. Blank and Ruggles (1993) show that only 60 percent of
eligible women actually take up welfare benefits. Those who do are
likely to differ from those who do not in many unobservable respects.
Hill and O'Neill (1992) find that, when IV methods are used to control
for AFDC status, AFDC participation has no effect on children's scores
on a standardized test of vocabulary, conditional on income. They do
not control for the potential endogeneity of income. Currie and Cole
(1993) use data from the 1979 to 1988 waves of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY) to examine the effect of AFDC participation
during pregnancy on the utilization of prenatal care and birth weight.
They attempt to control for selection into the AFDC program in two
ways. First, they instrument AFDC participation using state-level varia-
15Concern is often expressed that AFDC has contributed to the problem by undermining
family valuesby supporting single parenthood and allowing teenagers to set up house-
keeping on their own once they have a child. The Family Support Act of 1988 eliminated
some of the perverse incentives of the system by requiring all states to establish AFDC-UP
programs and to make more strenuous efforts to establish paternity and extract child-
support payments from fathers.
16Moore and Caldwell also find no effect for the rate at which AFDC applications were
accepted. However, they did find that the availability of family planning clinics had a
significant negative effect on the probability of teen pregnancy.16Currie
tion in program characteristics. Second, they focus on the sample of
children who are siblings and estimate models that control for fixed
effects associated with each mother. This procedure "differences out"
any fixed maternal characteristics (such as lack of education) associated
with program participation. Finally, they control for a measure of "per-
manent income" on the grounds that this is less subject to endogeneity
bias than a measure of contemporaneous income. They do not find any
significant effect of AFDC participation on birth weight. Together, these
studies suggest that income from AFDC has much the same effect on
children as family income from any other source.
3.1.1 The Effects of the EITCIf it is difficult to identify the effects of
cash transfers under the AFDC, the problems involved in identifying the
effects of the EITC are even more formidable. The fundamental difficulty
is that the amount of the credit depends only on the parents' earnings,
and earnings are likely to reflect many unobserved factors relevant to
child well-being. However, the EITC is in many respects similar to the
"Negative Income Tax" (NIT), an income-guarantee program that was
subjected to exhaustive scrutiny through a number of large-scale social
experiments, although it was never implemented. This section draws
the parallels between the two programs, and discusses what can be
learned about the effects of cash transfers from the NIT experiments.
Under an NIT, a family who earns no income is guaranteed a mini-
mum level of income, G. Families with earnings Y receive a payment D,
where D = G - t1Y. The quantity B = G/t1 is referred to as the break-even
level of income, since workers who earn more than B receive no pay-
ments. If income is equal to the wage multiplied by hours worked, and
workers face a tax rate t, then workers on the NIT earn w(1 - t - t1) for
every hour of work, whereas workers with incomes above B earn w(1 -
t). That is, workers on the NIT face a higher implicit tax rate than other
workers. Hence, both the EITC and the NIT work through the tax sys-
tem to increase the level and reduce the variance of income among the
poor.
In order to investigate whether the NIT created significant work disin-
centives, the Office of Economic Opportunity under President Nixon
authorized four large-scale social experiments. The first experiment, in
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, lasted from 1968 until 1972 and involved
1,357 low-income couples. A rural experiment took place in Iowa and
North Carolina from 1969 to 1973 and included 809 low-income rural
families. A third experiment was conducted in Gary, Indiana, between
1971 and 1974 and was composed of 1,780 African-American house-
holds, 59 percent of them female-headed. The largest experiment, whichWelfare and the Well-Being of Children17
affected 4,800 families, was conducted in Seattle and Denver from 1971
to 1982.
The NIT experiments represented the first large-scale attempt to inves-
tigate social policy using a treatment-and-control design with random
assignment. Treatments received an income-guarantee level and a tax
rate. The guarantees were usually expressed as a percentage of the fed-
eral poverty line, and ranged from 50 to 250 percent. The average pay-
ments in the Seattle/Denver experiment, for example, ranged from $919
to $2,031 (1972 dollars), depending on the treatment group. By way of
comparison, the poverty line for a family of three in 1972 was $3,099. The
NIT experiments provide a unique opportunity to assess the effects of
income transfers per se on the well-being of children in poor families.
In principle, the use of random assignment overcomes the problem of
selection that is ubiquitous in the program evaluation literature, and
allows the effects of the program to be identified through a simple com-
parison of treatments and controls. However, the NIT experiment was
flawed in two respects. First, treatments and controls were randomly
assigned only within income categories. Hence, the cell sizes available
for treatment/control comparisons are very small. Second, controls were
much more likely to leave the experiment than treatments. These two
problems mean that much of the NIT data has been analyzed using
conventional nonexperimental methods and that the results are sensitive
to the way problems of nonrandom selection into treatment groups and
attrition are handled (Ashenfelter and Plant, 1990).
These problems may account for inconsistent findings across experi-
mental populations and for econometric estimates that are at odds with
those derived from simple comparisons of treatments and controls. For
example, Kehrer and Wolin (1979) find that the mean birth weight of
infants born to the treatment group in the Gary experiment was actually
lower than the birth weight of the controls. Yet estimates from their
structural model suggests that the infants of treatments had higher birth
weights in nine out of twelve maternal age groups. O'Conner, Madden,
and Pringle (1976) examined the effect of the NIT on child nutrition
using data from the rural experiment. Among subjects in North Caro-
lina, they found positive and significant treatment effects on intakes of
total calories, calcium, phosphorus, iron, riboflavin, and vitamin C.
However, the treatment did not appear to have any significant effect in
Iowa, a finding that the authors attribute to the relative poverty of the
North Carolina sample.
The results from the rural and Gary experiments also have been used
to examine the effect of the NIT on schooling attainment. Maynard and
Crawford (1976) found that elementary school children from NIT fami-18Currie
TABLE 3.
School Performance in the Rural Experiment: Differences between
Treatments and Controls as a Percent of Control Mean.
Source: Maynard and Crawford (1976). There were 847 children.
Significant at the 90 percent level of confidence.
Significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
n.e. Not estimated due to lack of data.
lies in North Carolina showed statistically significant improvements in
attendance, performance on standardized tests, and grades. However,
there were no effects for older children or for elementary school children
in Iowa. Their results are reproduced in Table 3. Once again, this pattern
of results is attributed to the fact that the children in North Carolina were
much more disadvantaged than those in Iowa. Maynard and Murnane
(1979) found that in the Gary experiment the NIT treatment had positive
effects on the reading scores of younger children but that these effects
were statistically significant only among children whose families had
been in the program for three or more years.
Finally, in an analysis of data from the New Jersey experiment, Mallar
(1977) found that teenagers whose parents were enrolled in an NIT plan
were between 20 percent and 90 percent more likely to complete high
school, depending on the parameters of the plan. This group also com-
pleted one-third to one-and-a-half more years of education than their
counterparts in the control group. Venti (1984), however, found only an
11 percent increase in the probability of completing high school for
youth in the Seattle/Denver experiment. This lower estimate seems more
probable in view of the relatively short duration of the experiments, and
the many long-term factors (such as achievement in early grades) that
have been linked to educational attainment. These results also may be
related to the fact that in all four experiments youths in treatment house-
holds were less likely to be employed than controls (Robins, 1985).
These studies suggest that the relatively large income transfers made
to poor families under the NIT had a positive effect on the nutritional
Grades 2-8 Grades 9-12
North North
Measure Carolina Iowa Carolina Iowa
Days absent _30** -20.0 3 -17
Academic Grades 6* -5.0 4 -5
Achievement Tests
(deviation from norm)
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status and educational attainment of children, especially among the poor-
est families. However, the magnitudes vary so greatly from study to
study that it is difficult to say how large these effects are. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, studies of the consumption effects of the NIT also sug-
gest that families spent much of the subsidy on goods that may not have
been directly related to the well-being of their children. For example, the
NIT appears to have had a negative effect on the labor supply of married
women17 and positive effects on housing expenditures and purchases of
consumer durables (Robins, 1985; Michael, 1978). The NIT may also
have increased the probability of marital dissolution, although this find-
ing remains controversial (cf. Cain and Wissoker, 1990; Hannan and
Tuma, 1990).
4. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF IN-KIND TRANSFERS
4.1 Earmarked Transfers
4.1.1 Effects of the Food Stamp ProgramIt would be surprising to find
that the marginal propensity to consume food out of food stamp income
differed from the marginal propensity to consume food out of cash in-
come, because 85 to 90 percent of participating households have food
expenditures that exceed the value of their FSP benefits. Two experimen-
tal "cashout" programs have suggested that food stamp income is
treated exactly like cash income. However, one of these programs took
place in Puerto Rico where there was a thriving black market in stamps
before the cashout (Moffitt, 1989), and the other affected only elderly
households (Blanchard, 1982). Hence it is not clear that the results of
these experiments can be transferred to mainland families with children.
On the other hand, nonexperimental evaluations of the fungibility of
food stamps among families with children are contaminated by the fail-
ure to properly control for the endogeneity of program participation. For
example, Table 4 shows that FSP households purchase more nutritious
food for home consumption than nonparticipating households,18 but it is
not clear whether this is a cause or an effect of program participation. It
might be the case that families who participate care more about nutri-
tion. Because the FSP is federally administered, all geographic variation
in benefits comes from interactions between the AFDC program and the
FSP. Many researchers have tried to identify IV models by finding char-
17 No convincing evidence of a link between maternal employment and children's well-
being has been found. See Blau and Grossberg (1990) and Desai et al. (1989).
IS These differences remain when observable characteristics of the household are con-
trolled for.20Currie
TABLE 4.
Household Nutrient Availability as a Percentage of the RDA for
Persons Eating in the Households.
Source: Fraker (1990b).
acteristics of families that affect program participation without affecting
food expenditures. Fraker (1990b) provides a review of this literature.
Fraker (1990a) presents one of the few studies that attempts to use the
geographic variation in FSP benefits to identify the effects of the pro-
gram. He finds that in ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, partici-
pation in the FSP has a positive effect on seven of sixteen nutrients
examined. When he instruments using maximum FSP benefits as one of
the instrumental variables, the standard errors rise but the point esti-
mates stay relatively constant. This result suggests that positive and
significant effects of the FSP may appear with greater variation in benefit
levels or larger samples.
The results of Korenman and Miller (1992) are also inconclusive. They
use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to examine the
effect of FSP participation during pregnancy on birth weight, on the inci-
dence of low birth weight, on gestational age, on the incidence of prematu-
rity, and on the mother's weight gain during pregnancy. They find a
statistically significant effect of participation on women with incomes less
than 50 percent of the poverty line on birth weight of first-born children in
OLS regressions. However, they find no effect for children of higher-birth
order; nor do they find one when they control for unobserved characteris-
tics of the mother using fixed effects models. They also report that the
height-for-age of children whose families received food stamps in the year








Food Energy 139 121 +18
Protein 232 203 +29
Calcium 119 111 +8
Iron 151 137 +14
Magnesium 134 123 +11
Phosphorous 202 183 +19
Vitamin A 213 178 +35
Thiamin 194 165 +29
Riboflavin 204 180 +24
Vitamin B6 132 114 +18
Vitamin B12 235 191 +44
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results highlight the importance of controlling for unobserved heterogene-
ity when evaluating the efficacy of social programs.
There are two intriguing hypotheses that have been advanced to ex-
plain why food stamp income might have an effect on nutrient intakes
different from that of cash income. First, it is possible that households
view FSP benefits as a more permanent source of income than other
sources. Second, women with children may have higher marginal pro-
pensities to purchase food than men, and the female head of household
may have more control of food stamp coupons (which are likely to be
issued in her name) than she has over the household's cash income.19
Neither theory has been subjected to an empirical test.
4.1.2 Effects of Housing AssistanceDeficient housing can pose a haz-
ard to children's health. Lead poisoning, for example, is three times
more common among poor children than among nonpoor children and
is directly related to housing conditions. The risk of accidental death is
also three times higher for poor children, and some of this increased risk
may stem from hazards in the home (Starfield, 1985). In 1989, 18 percent
of poor households (2.2 million households) were in housing with se-
vere or moderate physical problems, compared with 7 percent of
nonpoor households.2° If housing assistance enables families in deficient
housing to move to adequate housing, then it probably improves the
physical well-being of children.
Nonetheless, little evidence is available on this question. A 1988 HUD
study found that more than half of public-housing households were in
projects that needed moderate to substantial rehabilitation just to meet
HUD's own standards. The estimated cost of bringing these units up to
standard would exceed $20 billion (1986) (Lazere et al., 1991). Most
voucher programs require families to locate a landlord willing to partici-
pate in the Section 8 program and to arrange inspections and repairs
with the landlord within a fixed period of time. One case study of fifty-
six single mothers in eastern Massachusetts in 1985 and 1986 found that
after waiting an average of two years to receive a certificate, twenty-four
women returned them unused because they were unable to find housing
19Some circumstantial evidence pertinent to this hypothesis comes from the Washington
State Welfare Reform Demonstration Program. AFDC recipients in demonstration counties
had the option of choosing to receive their AFDC and food stamp benefits in the form of a
single consolidated check rather than continuing to receive food stamp coupons. Over 20
percent of these women opted to continue receiving the coupons.
20Problems HUD classifies as severe include lack of basic plumbing facilities, serious
heating breakdowns, and rat infestations. An example of a moderate deficiency is the use
of unvented gas, oil, or kerosene heaters as primary heating equipment.22Currie
that met program requirements within the allotted time (Mulroy, 1988).
The remaining women were able to improve their housing situations.
Data from the 1986 Freestanding Voucher Demonstration program indi-
cates that 60 percent of eligible households participated and that 57
percent of the subsidy went toward increasing rental payments (Ken-
nedy and Finkel, 1987). Hence, there is some evidence that voucher
programs decrease the number of participating householdsliving in
substandard housing.21
Unaffordable housing can also have harmful effects on children, by
squeezing family budgets. Standards set by federal law define affordable
housing as housing that consumes no more than 30% of a household's
"adjusted" income.22 In 1989, three quarters of poor households in the
United States paid over 30 percent of their income for housing, and more
than half spent over 50 percent (Lazere et al., 1991). Families on AFDC
fare just as badly, because in all but seven states, the maximum AFDC
benefit for a family of three is less than HUD's estimate of the "Fair
Market Rent" for a two-bedroom apartment. For families in these circum-
stances, receiving housing assistance can effectively double the family's
cash income. Meyer et al. (1993) report that among low-income children
attending a Boston clinic, those living in public housing or receiving rent
subsidies are significantly less likely to suffer from iron anemia. This
evidence is consistent with the evidence from the NIT experiments,
suggesting that large cash transfers can improve the nutritional status of
the poorest children.
Finally, in principle, housing assistance can affect children by influenc-
ing the parents' choice of neighborhoods and schools. For example,
Johnson (1986) found that recipients of housing allowances frequently
moved to better neighborhoods, although they did not usually move to
less segregated ones. Yet, it is very difficult to identify the effects of
neighborhoods and schools because any relationship observed between
neighborhood characteristics and individual outcomes could reflect the
characteristics of the family or one of its members that drew them to the
neighborhood in the first place.
The Gautreaux program provides a "natural experiment" that sheds
light on this issue. It grew out of a lawsuit filed in 1966 against the
Chicago Housing Authority and HUD on behalf of public-housing resi-
21Contemporary voucher programs seem to have larger effects on rental payments than
do subsidies offered to families under the Experimental Housing Program. See Apgar
(1990) for a discussion.
Adjustments include deductions for dependent children, handicapped or elderly family
members, and for excessive health or child-care costs.Welfare and the Well-Being of Children23
dents. The suit charged that the Chicago low-rent, public-housingpro-
gram had been administered in a racially discriminatory manner. A
consent decree established by the Supreme Court in 1976 created a
unique demonstration program with the aim of reducing segregation in
Chicago's public housing.
Under the program, residents in public housing projectscan apply for
Section 8 housing certificates and move to private apartments. Some
apartments are in predominantly white suburbs, whereas others are in
the inner city. Although the persons admitted to the programare not a
random sample of public-housing residents,u the program assigns apart-
ments in a more or less random manner; the apartment an applicant is
offered depends on what is available when the applicant reaches the top
of the waiting list. Very few applicants turn down an apartment, because
they are unlikely to be offered another if they do. Hence, differences in
outcomes between applicants assigned to the suburbs and those as-
signed to the city are likely to reflect true neighborhood effects.
Rosenbaum (1986) found that children of participants who moved to
the suburbs attended schools that were superior in terms of smaller class
sizes and satisfaction with teachers and courses, On average, these chil-
dren had better attitudes toward school and suffered no permanent
decline in grades or attendance. Some children, however, had trouble
meeting higher academic standards in the suburbs and were placed in
lower grades, lower tracks, or remedial education.
The children in the original study were re-interviewed 7 years later
(Rosenbaum, 1992). Unfortunately, because only 59% (107) of the origi-
nal sample children could be located, the estimated program effectsmay
be biased if there was differential attrition from the two groups. Still, the
results are striking: children who had moved to the suburbswere 15
percent less likely to have dropped out of school, 16 percent more likely
to be in a college-track program, and 34 percent more likely to be em-
ployed than those who had moved within the inner city. All of these
differences were statistically significant at the 90 percent level of confi-
dence. These findings suggest that voucher programs can have a posi-
tiveffect on the life chances of children if they enable families to find
housing in better neighborhoods. On the other hand, they suggest that
the disamenities associated with large public housing projects may have
significant negative effects. HUD is currently planning several housing
Applicants are screened to make sure that they have paid their rent regularly, and that
they have adequate housekeeping abilities. The program does not serve families withmore
than four children because few large housing units are available in the suburbs. In addi-
tion, the act of applying for an apartment in an unknown location may indicate thata
person is strongly motivated to improve his or her circumstances.24Currie
experiments that will be based on the Gautreaux model.24 An experimen-
tal evaluation that took care to minimize attrition could shed great light
on the possible beneficial effects of housingvouchers.
4.2 In-Kind Programs That Target Specific Services to Children
4.2.1 Medicaid The introduction of Medicaid in 1966 coincided with
decreases in infant mortality, increases in hospitalization rates for poor
children, and an increase in the frequency of doctor visits to poor, relative
to nonpoor, children (Danzinger and Stern, 1990; Starfield,1985). The
timing of the decrease in infant mortality is suggestive but not totally
compelling evidence of a beneficial effect of Medicaid on the health of
poor children, because infant mortalityperiodically falls sharply in re-
sponse to technological change.Time-series evidence regarding the
number of doctor visits is also difficult to interpret, because visits for
illness reflect both morbidity and utilization of care. This section reviews
recent evidence that Medicaid coverage improves access to preventive
care and that the gains are related to declines inthe prevalence of low birth
weight and infant mortality.
Currie and Thomas (1993a) use the 1986 and 1988 waves of the National
Longitudinal Survey's Child Mother file (NLSCM) to examine the relation-
ship between insurance coverage and whether a child had a routine
checkup in the last six months. As discussed above, visits for preventive
care are a more satisfactory measure of utilizationthan the total number of
doctor visits because they do not depend on illness. In each year, mothers
were asked whether their child's health care wascovered by either Medic-
aid or private insurance. The ability to distinguish between Medicaid and
private insurance is useful because children with private health-insurance
coverage tend to be better off in observable(and presumably also in
unobservable) dimensions than children with Medicaid coverage. Hence,
if Medicaid has a stronger effect on the utilization of preventive care than
private health-insurance coverage, then the evidence is strong that the
estimated effect reflects insurance coverage rather than omitted character-
istics correlated with selection into the Medicaid programs.
Ordinary least squares estimates of the probability that a child had a
routine checkup are shown in Table 5. These regressions include dummy
variables for both Medicaid coverage and private health-insurance cover-
24 Personal communication with Susan Mayer, Department of Sociology, Northwestern
University.
For example, up to half of the decline in infant mortality between 1989 and 1990 may be
due to the introduction of surfactant therapya treatment for premature infants suffering
Respiratory Distress Syndrome (Horbar, 1993).Welfare and the Well-Being of Children25
TABLE 5.
OLS Estimates of the Effects of Medicaid and Private Health Insurance
on the Probability of a Routine Checkup.
Source: Currie and Thomas (1993a).
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also included: The mother's Armed Forces Quali-
fication Test score; an indicator equal to one if she was in the poverty sample;an indicator equal to one if
the mother lived in an urban area at age fourteen; the child's gender; county incomeper capita; the
number of physicians per 1,000 state residents; the number of hospital beds per 1,000 state residents;
the state infant mortality rates; dummy variables for residence in the Northeast, South,or West; an
indicator equal to one if the data came from the 1986 survey and zero otherwise; and interactions ofall
these variables with the indicator for African Americans. Since observations from both the 1986 and
1988 NLSCM surveys have been pooled, a control for the earlier survey was included to allow for
possible differences between the two waves.
age. The excluded category is the absence of insurance. The models also
include a full set of interactions with an indicator equal toone if the child is
African American. This specification is equivalent to estimatingseparate
models for whites and African Americans, but allowsa ready comparison
of the effects of insurance coverage on the twogroups. The complete set of
control variables is listed in the table notes.
Children's Ages in Years in 1988
1-3 3-5 5-9
Intercept .226 .712 .104
(.237) (.290) (.290)
African American .238 - .027 -.406
(.387) (.482) (.447)
Type of Insurance
Medicaid .044 .133 .043
(.036) (.039) (.037)
African American .051 - .052 .102
* Medicaid (.061) (.069) (.060)
Private Insurance .031 .005 .069
(.028) (.033) (.032)
African American - .008 - .044 - .046
* private insurance (.054) (.063) (.056)
Maternal characteristics
Permanent income -.004 - .057 - .040
(.023) (.027) (.027)
African American .034 .005 .041 * income (.039) (.048) (.044)
Top grade in 1988 .021 .019 .017
(.006) (.008) (.008)
African American - .014 - .004 .019
* top grade (.014) (.017) (.015)
R-squared .035 .044 .033
Number of Observations 2183 2260 264226Currie
Medicaid coverage is estimated to increase the probability of a routine
checkup among white children three to five years of age by 13 percent.
In contrast, African-American children on Medicaid are between 8 per-
cent and 15 percent more likely to receive a checkup atall ages. On the
other hand, there are no statistically significant differences between chil-
dren with private health-insurance coverage and those without health-
insurance coverage, except among white children of school age. This
result may reflect the fact that many private insurance policies do not
cover preventive pediatric care (Mitchell andSchurman, 1984), so that
children may not receive regular preventive care until they enter the
school system.
These OLS models do not control for selection into the program. It is
possible to do better using these data, because in many cases, there are
repeated measures of the same child. Currie and Thomas (1993a) also
estimate conditional logit models that include fixed effects for each child.
These models control for any unobserved characteristics of the child
(such as the education of the mother or innate sickliness) that may be
correlated with program participation and examine the effects of
changes in Medicaid and private-insurance status on the probability of
receiving a checkup. The estimates are remarkably similar to the OLS
estimates discussed above.
Another way to control for selection into the Medicaid program is to
identify the effects of Medicaid using state-level variation in the cover-
age of pregnant women and children. Asdiscussed in the first part, the
federal government began expanding the Medicaid coverage of preg-
nant women and children beginning in 1984. By January 1992, a uni-
form, minimum floor for coverage had been established that was two to
three times higher than the floor that had existed in the average state
only four years earlier. However, this floor was raised at very different
rates in different states.
Currie and Gruber (1993) use data from The National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth, Vital Statistics, and the Current Population Survey
(CPS) to examine the impact of the Medicaid expansions on the usage of
prenatal care, the incidence of low birth weight, and infant mortality.
Using CPS data, they first construct two measures of the generosityof
state Medicaid programs in each year. The first is the fractionof women
aged fifteen to forty-four who would have been eligible for Medicaid had
they become pregnant. The second measure controls for nonprogram-
matic sources of heterogeneity between states by drawing a random
sample of U.S. women in each year and calculating the percentage of
them that would have been eligible under each state's rules. Using this
second measure Currie and Gruber find evidence that a 20 percent in-Welfare and the Well-Being of Children27
crease in the fraction of women eligible for Medicaid would be associ-
ated with a 4 percent decrease in the probability that the initiation of
prenatal care was delayed beyond the first trimester. Turning to state-
level data from vital statistics, they also find that the Medicaidexpan-
sions were associated with improvements in birth outcomes: a 20 per-
cent increase in eligibility decreased the incidence of low birth weight
and infant mortality by 2 percent and 7 percent respectively.
One caveat to these positive results is that early expansions of Medic-
aid coverage to poor women who had been ineligible for AFDC for
reasons of family structure (e.g., single pregnant women without eligi-
ble children) had much greater effects on the incidence of low birth
weight than later extensions of coverage to women with incomes be-
tween 100 percent and 185 percent of the poverty line. Their analysis of
self-reported Medicaid coverage in the CPS suggests that manywomen
in the latter group did not take up their new benefits.
4.2.2 WIC WIC is more interventionist than traditional welfarepro-
grams: eligibility is often determined by medical examinations and blood
tests, and nutritional counseling is required. In addition, the types and
even brands of foods that can be purchased using WIC coupons are
strictly controlled. Many studies find that WIC has positive effects on the
utilization of prenatal care and on measures of infant health, including
birth weight, the incidence of low birth weight, gestational age, and
infant mortality.26
Schramm (1985) and Devaney et al. (1990) examine the effects of WIC
on the Medicaid costs of newborns. The results are of particular interest
because they can be used to compare the costs and benefits of the WIC
program. Schramm found that in 1980 a dollar spent on WIC reduced
Medicaid costs in Missouri by approximately $.80 in the first thirty to
forty-five days after birth. Devaney et al. examine Medicaid costs in the
first sixty days after birth. Their study examined all Medicaid births in
1987 for Florida, Minnesota, North Carolina, and South Carolina, as well
as births from January through June 1988 in Texas. The authors examine
women covered by Medicaid, comparing those who were enrolled in
WIC with those who were not. Limiting the study to Medicaid eligibles
is likely to eliminate some but not all of the observed and unobserved
differences between WIC participants and nonparficipants. The average
costs for newborns and their mothers in the sixty days after birth ranged
from $2,433 to $3,822, depending on the state. The reductions in Medic-
aid costs for newborns and their mothers that were associated with WIC
26See Devaney, Bilheimer, and Schore (1990) for a review.28Currie
TABLE 6.
Estimated Benefit-Cost Ratios for WIC Participants.
Source: Devaney, Bilheimer, and Schore (1990).
aMedicaid costs are from birth to sixty days after birth.
bAll estimates are statistically significant at the .01 level (two-tail test), except in Minnesota, where the
estimate is statistically significant at the .07 level (two-tail test) and at the .03 level (one-tail test).
CMedicaid costs refer to hospital costs only.
participation ranged from $277 to $598. As Table 6 shows, the reductions
in Medicaid costs more than offset the costs of providing WIC to these
women.
Unfortunately, only two WIC studies, by Metcoff et al. (1985) and Caan
et al. (1987), have used random assignment to generate a comparison
group. Studies that do not use random assignmentsuffer from the fact
that participants may differ from non-participants in unobserved ways. If
WIC participants are in worse condition than nonparticipants because
places are scarce and only the neediest are admitted into the program,
then studies that compare WIC participants and nonparticipants will un-
derestimate the effects of the program. Conversely, if WIC participants
are more highly motivated or better informed thannonparticipants, then
studies of this type may overestimate the program's effects.
Without knowing more about the selection mechanism underlying
participation, it is difficult to assess the direction of this bias. However,
given that the program is locally administered, the factors governing
selection into the WIC program are likely to differ considerably over time













Newborns and mothers $347 $196 1.77
Minnesota
Newborns and mothers $277 $151 1.83
North Carolina
Newborns $744 $191 3.90
Newborns and mothers $598 $191 3.13
South Carolinac
Newborns and mothers $565 $232 2.44
Texas
Newborns $573 $202 2.84
Newborns and mothers $493 $202 2.44Welfare and the Well-Being of Children29
to which WIC places are rationed, the amount of advertising, the loca-
tion of WIC providers, and so on. Hence, the fact that theestimated
effects are remarkably constant across samples drawn fromdifferent
states at different times suggests that the positive resultsare not entirely
driven by the selection of women who are likely to have goodoutcomes
into the program.
Although studies of the effects of WIC on the nutrient intake ofchil-
dren generally find positive effects of WIC participation (cf.Fraker,
1990b), these studies are also plagued by possible selection bias. One
way to control for selection effects is to follow the same child over time.
The Centers for Disease Control (DHHS, 1978) report the results ofa
study that followed child WIC participants in six statesover a two-year
interval. The study found that after three WIC visits thepercentage of
children who were anemic fell from 23 to 10among children 6 to 23
months of age, and from 24 to 12 among children 24 to 59 months old. In
addition, 21 percent of 6- to 23-month-old children entering theprogram
were below the tenth percentile of length-for-ageafter three WIC vis-
its, only 15 percent of these children were below this cut-off.
Hicks et al. (1982) report encouraging results froma small-scale study
of the effects of WIC participation on later cognitive development.They
note that previous studies have established a link betweensevere malnu-
trition, protein deficiencies, or anemia, and cognitive deficits. Theques-
tion is to what extent a less severe malnutritionor anemia threatens the
development of poor children in the United States. Their study focuses
on twenty-one pairs of siblings from rural Louisiana. Because of the
design of the WIC program in that state, theyounger child in each pair
was eligible for supplementation beginning in the third trimester of
pregnancy, while the older child became eligible for WIC only after the
first year. The results show that the "early supplementation"group had
significantly higher scores on tests of verbal ability and IQ,as well as on
a "Draw-A-Person" test.
It is possible that these results are biased by the fact that theyounger
child always received the early supplementation. However, whenthe
authors use measures taken when the two childrenwere the same age,
such as their grade-point averages in gradeone and their heights-for-
age, they still find early supplementation to have a significant effect.
They note in general a slight negative association between parityand IQ;
so the finding that the younger children had higher IQs is unlikely to be
solely an artifact of birth order.
4.2.3 School Nutrition ProgramsIn 1979 a bipartisan Senate committee
requested the secretary of agriculture to commissiona study of school30Currie
nutrition programs. This request resulted in the NationalEvaluation of
School Nutrition Programs (NESNP), which surveyed students, parents,
and school food-service administrators.
Hanes et al. (1984) use the NESNP to compare thenutritional content
of the breakfasts and lunches of participants and nonparticipants.They
also examine nutrient intakes over a twenty-four-hourperiod in order to
assess the extent to which families compensatefor school meals by reduc-
ing the child's home food consumption. They findthat school lunches
contain more of almost all the nutrients that were examinedthan nonpar-
ticipant lunches. The fact that school lunch participants alsohave higher
twenty-four-hour nutrient intakes indicates that families do not entirely
offset the effects of food supplementation.
The effects of the School Breakfast Program are less striking.School
breakfasts contain more calcium, phosphorus, protein, andmagnesium
than other breakfasts, but they have less vitamin A, B6, niacin,thiamin,
and iron. Children who eat a school breakfast havehigher twenty-four-
hour intakes of calcium and phosphorus than those who eat analternative
breakfast, but the initial gains in intakes of other nutrients areoffset
during the course of the day. However, the availability of aschool break-
fast does have a positive effect on the probability that achild eats break-
fast, and children who eat breakfast have highertwenty-four-hour nutri-
ent intakes than children who do not.
The differences in the effects of the NSLP and theSBP on nutrient
intakes probably reflect differences in federal standards.Lunches must
conform to federally determine4 meal patterns thatspecify the types,
amounts, and methods of food preparation. Thestandards for breakfasts
are much looser, perhaps becausethe government wishes to encourage
school districts to participate. The two nutrients that areconsumed in
greater quantities over a twenty-four-hour periodby school breakfast
participants are both found in milk, which is a compulsory component
of the breakfast meal pattern (Radkowski and Gale,1984a). Hence, it
seems that the effectiveness ofthe school nutrition programs is directly
related to the strictness of the federal guidelines governing them.
Surprisingly, there have been few attempts to evaluate the effectsof
school nutrition programs on cognitive outcomes. In one ofthe more
compelling studies, Meyers et al. (1989) examined 1,092 third- tosixth-
grade children in Lawrence, Massachusetts, beforeand after the SBP
was introduced in their school in1987. They found that the breakfast
program participants showed greater improvements onthe Comprehen-
sive Test of Basic Skills, relative to their initial scores,than nonpartici-
pant children. SBP participation also reduced tardiness.Welfare and the Well-Being of Children31
4.2.4 Head Start McKey et al. (1985) provide one of the most recent
surveys of the Head Start literature. Much of the research focuses on
assessing cognitive gains. The consensus of seventy-two experimental
studies is that Head Start has positive effects on IQ andmeasures of
"school readiness" that fade out by the end of the third grade. However,
as discussed above, experimental evaluations of long-term outcomes
may be severely biased by attrition from the sample. Also, most studies
do not provide separate analyses by race, even though racial differences
in the levels of scores on standardized tests suggest that the effects of
Head Start may differ by race.
Currie and Thomas (1993b) use data from 1986, 1988, and 1990waves
of the NLSCM to investigate the longer-term cognitive effects of Head
Start. They provide one of the first analyses of the Head Start program
based on a large national sample of children who attended regular Head
Start programs. About 8 percent of white children, 16 percent of His-
panic children, and 27 percent of African-American children in their
sample participated. They find some evidence of longer-term cognitive
gains correlated with participation in Head Start: Head Start appears to
have a positive effect on the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT)
scores of white and Hispanic children over eight years old. However,
there are no effects on the PPVT scores of African-American childrenor
on the mathematics or reading scores of any children in this age group.
Estimates based on differences between siblings are shown in Table 7.
These models control for unobserved characteristics common to both
children by including a fixed effect for each family. These models also
include an indicator variable equal to one if a child attended another
type of preschool. Currie and Thomas find that even within the same
family, children generally attend preschool when the family is relatively
well off and Head Start when the family is relatively disadvantaged.
Hence, the fact that Head Start has a greater impact on testscores than
preschool attendance suggests that the estimated effect is unlikely to be
an artifact of patterns of selection into the two types of programs.
Currie and Thomas also find that past participation in Head Start
reduces the probability that white and Hispanic children tenyears and
older report repeating a grade. Estimates from models with fixed effects
for families are shown in Table 8. Attendance at a non-Head Startpre-
school has no effect on the probability of grade repetition. These results
are consistent with those of Copple, Cline, and Smith (1987), who fol-
lowed children in thirty-three Philadelphia schools from school entryup
to grade six and found that children who had participated in Head Start














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Head Start Effects on Grade Repetition, from Models That Include
Family Fixed Effects, for ChildrenTen Years Old.
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the sample). They were also less likely to have been placed in remedial
education. In addition, Head Start children had 2 to 23 percent fewer
absences and were more likely to be present when standardized tests
were administered. It would be useful to replicate these results in other
data sets because the loss of 70 percent of the students in Copple, Cline,
and Smith's initial sample by the sixth grade may subject their estimates
to severe attrition bias.
In addition to improving cognitive attainment, Head Start aims to
"provide a comprehensive health services program which includesa
broad range of medical services..." (Head Start Bureau, 1992). Thirty-
four studies reviewed by McKey et al. provide qualitative evidence that
children in Head Start are more likely than nonparticipants to receive
routine checkups, dental care, and screenings for speech, language,
vision, hearing, and developmental delays.
Currie and Thomas (1993b) provide quantitative analyses of the effects
of Head Start participation on the probability of immunization against
measles as of 1990 and on height-for-age. In addition to mandating the
provision of preventive medical care, the Head Start program perfor-
mance standards state that "every child in a part-day program will re-




Head Start - .51 - .03 - .46
(2.27) (.31) (2.96)
Other preschool - .08 - .17 - .005
(.67) (1.34) (.02)
Log income at Age 3 .08 .14 - .38
(.75) (1.10) (2.04)
Male .06 .13 .01
(.97) (1.93) (.09)
Age in months in 1990 .004 - .001 .01
(1.45) (.35) (1.91)
First born - .13 .05 - .16
(1.35) (.57) (1.20)
Number of Observations 269 311 141
R-squared .63 .59 .65
Mean Dependent Variables .36 .47 .32
Source: Currie and Thomas (1993b).
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FIGURE 4. Nonparametric Estimates of the Probability of a Measles
Shot by Race, Ethnicity, and Permanent Income.
Source: Currie and Thomas (1993b).
½ of daily nutritional needs ..." (Head Start Bureau, 1992). Both nutri-
tious food and better medical care are expected to improve child growth.
Hence, there is some reason to expect a positive effect of participation in
Head Start on child height as well as on immunization rates.
Figure 4 shows nonparametric estimates of the relationship between
Head Start and preschool status, permanent income,27 and immuniza-
tion status in 1990. The figure shows that for white and African-
American children, the probability of having been immunized against
measles is significantly higher at all income levels for children who were
in Head Start relative to those who went to other preschools.28 The latter
27Curne and Thomas (1993b) define permanent income as the logarithm of average annual
household income between 1978 and 1990 (in real 1990 dollars). Use of this measure should
attenuate the influence of measurement error and breaks the link between household
income at a point in time and eligibility for the Head Start program. Household permanent
income is about $29,000 for the average white child, $23,000 for Hispanics, and $18,000for
African Americans in this sample.
28Figures 2 and 3 show locally weighted, smoothed scatterplots (LOWESS) (Cleveland,
1979), which are a nearest neighbor-type estimator. Essentially, each observation is re-
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are, in turn, more likely to have been immunized than those who did not
attend any preschool. Among Hispanics, both children who went to
Head Start and those who went to other preschools are more likely to
have been immunized than those who did not attend any preschool.29
Although they do not have data about the utilization of other preventive
care services, Currie and Thomas suggest that if Head Start children are
more likely to receive immunizations, they also may be more likely to
receive the other services mandated by the program. Finally, they show
that, conditional on household permanent income, children who at-
tended Head Start are significantly taller than those who attended no
preschool. These benefits of Head Start persist when family fixed effects
are controlled for: Head Start participation is associated with a 10%
increase in the probability that white children and a 12% increase in the
probability that African-American children receive measles shots, and
African-American children who attended Head Start are significantly
taller than their siblings who did not.30
5. CONCLUSIONS
The current state of knowledge about the effects of welfare programs on
child well-being is summarized in Table 9, which presents a matrix of
programs and outcomes: each cell shows what we know about the ef-
fects of a particular program on a given outcome. For brevity's sake, only
positive findings have been reported. The most striking feature of the
table is that there are many empty cellswe clearly need to learn a great
deal more about how these programs work before we can make in-
formed public policy.
However, the cells with entries do tell a consistent story: programs
that target services directly to children have the largest measured effects,
whereas unrestricted cash-transfer programs have the smallest. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, families seem to treat cash transfers the same way they
treat other cash income. Expenditures on goods that directly increase the
well-being of children may increase, but so do expenditures on other
goods. As a result, large cash transfers under the NIT program had only
small and inconsistent effects on the nutrition and schooling attainment
of poor children.
Programs providing transfers to parents that are earmarked for specific
band around it. Hence the shape of the estimated function is determined locally through-
out the distribution of income (See also Hardle, 1990).
29All these differences are statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence.
° These fixed-effects estimates may be biased downward if there is measurement error, or














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































purposes also appear to have uncertain effects. There is little evidence
that participation in the Food Stamp Program increases the nutrient in-
take of poor children, although none has proven that it does not. The
evidence on housing programs is mixed. On the one hand, the physical
condition of public housing may be superior to that of alternative hous-
ing, and the cash value of the transfer may be very large relative to the size
of the family's income. On the other hand, the disamenities associated
with large public housing complexes are notorious. The Gautreaux experi-
ment suggests that voucher programs that enable families to move into
better neighborhoods may have large positive impacts on schooling attain-
ment and employment probabilities. But difficulties in accessing Section 8
housing probably prevent many families from realizing potential benefits.
Finally, Medicaid, WIC, the School Lunch Program, and Head Start all
have demonstrably positive effects on poor children.
One glaring omission from the current study is the lack of discussion
about multiple program participation. Many children are covered by
more than one program. For example, AFDC participants are covered by
Medicaid and are automatically eligible for food stamps. As of 1990, half
of AFDC children received free school lunches, 35 percent lived in public
or subsidized rental housing, and 19 percent participated in WIC. Con-
versely, half of all food stamp recipients, 42 percent of Medicaid recipi-
ents, 38 percent of WIC recipients, and 24 percent of those in public
housing also received AFDC. Moffitt (1992) estimates that in 1984, 26.4
percent of nonelderly, single-parent families received AFDC, Medicaid,
and food stamps, and 11 percent received at least one benefit in addition
to AFDC. It is impossible to say how multiple program participation
affects the child outcomes discussed above, since there has been virtu-
ally no research on this topic.
At this point it is instructive to consider the costs as well as the bene-
fits of two policy options. It is unlikely that AFDC benefit levels will be
raised in the near future given the unpopularity of the program. How-
ever, the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 aims to raise the EITC
enough over the next 5 years to "guarantee a working wage so that no
American who works full-time is forced to raise children in poverty"
(Clinton and Gore, 1992). In 1992, a family of four with one earner
working full time at $5 per hour (approximately the minimum wage)
would have required a credit of $4,000 to reach the poverty line. In fact,
such a family received a credit of approximately $1,400. A very crude
calculation is that increasing the generosity of the program three times
will raise the cost from the current $7 billion to $21 billion, and this
increase will only benefit children of working parents.
A second, much discussed policy would extend the benefits providedWelfare and the Well-Being of Children39
by targeted programs to all poor children. In the absence of additional
reforms, the Medicaid expansions already implemented will cover all
poor children by the turn of the century. If there are approximately
twelve million poor children and 28 percent of them are uninsured,31
and if the average cost of covering one of these children is equal to the
current cost of covering an AFDC child, then the cost of the Medicaid
expansions will be about $2.3 billion. The costs of expanding WIC and
Head Start to all eligible children would be $1.5 and $4.5 billion, respec-
tively. Finally, it would cost $.8 billion to restore the cuts that have been
made in the School Lunch Program. Hence, if a choice had to be made,
these calculations suggest that the more cost-effective policy would be to
increase expenditures on targeted programs.
REFERENCES
Angrist, Joshua (1990). "Lifetime Earnings and the Vietnam Era Draft Lottery:
Evidence from Social Security Administration Records." American Economic
Review, 1-336.
Apgar, William (1990). "Which Housing Policy Is Best?" Housing Policy Debate 1
(1): 1-32.
Ashenfelter, Orley, and Mark Plant (1990). "Non-Parametric Estimates of the
Labor Supply Effects of the NIT." Journal of Labor Economics 8 (1): 396-415.
Besley, Tim, and Steve Coate (1992). "Workfare vs. Welfare: Incentive Arguments
for Work Requirements in Poverty Alleviation Programs" AER, 249-261.
Blanchard, Lois, et al. (1982). Food Stamp SSI/Elderly Cashout Demonstration Evalua-
tion, Washington, DC: USDA Food and Nutrition Service.
Blank, Rebecca, and Patricia Ruggles (1993). "When Do Women Use AFDC and
Food Stamps? The Dynamics of Eligibility vs. Participation." NBER Working
Paper No. 4429.
Blau, Francine, and Adam Grossberg (1990). "Maternal Labor Supply and Chil-
dren's Cognitive Development." NBER Working Paper No. 3536.
Bloom, Barbara (1990). "Health Insurance and Medical Care." Advance Data from
Vital and Health Statistics of the National Center for Health Statistics 188. Washing-
ton, DC: Public Health Service. October 1, 1990.
Caan, Bette, Donna Horgen, Sheldon Margen, et al. (1987). "Benefits Associated
with WIC Supplemental Feeding during the Interpregnancy Interval." The
American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 45, 29-41.
Cain, Glen, and Douglas Wissoker (1990). "A Reanalysis of Marital Stability in
the Seattle-Denver Income-Maintenance Experiment." American Journal of Soci-
ology 95, 1235-1269.
Clarkson, Kenneth (1975). Food Stamps and Nutrition. Washington, DC: American
Enterprise Institute.
Cleveland, W.S. (1979). "Robust Locally-Weighted Regressions and Smoothing
Scatterplots." Journal of the American Statistical Association 74, 829-836.
31In 1988, 17% of all children and 28% of children with family incomes less than $10,000
were without health insurance coverage of any kind (Bloom, 1990).40Currie
Clinton, William, and Albert Gore (1992). Putting People First. New York: Times
Books.
Copple, C. E., M. G. Cline, and A. N. Smith (1987). Path to the Future: Long-Term
Effects of Head Start in the Philadelphia School District. Washington, DC: Head
Start Bureau, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
Currie, Janet, and Nancy Cole (1993). "Welfare and Child Health: The Link
Between AFDC Participation and Birth Weight." The American Economic Review
283 (3): 971-985.
and Jonathan Gruber (1993). "Insurance Coverage, Access to Care, and
Birth Outcomes: Evidence from Medicaid Expansions." Mimeo. National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
and Duncan Thomas (1993a). "Medicaid and Medical Care for Chil-
dren." NBER Working Paper No. 4284, March 1993, revised May 1993a.
,and (1993b). "Does Head Start Make a Difference?" NBER Work-
ing Paper No. 4406.
Danzinger, Sheldon, and Jonathan Stern (1990). "The Causes and Consequences
of Child Poverty in the United States." Research Report No. 90-194, Popula-
tion Studies Center, University of Michigan.
Desai, Sonalde, P. L. Chase-Lansdale, and Robert Michael (1989). "Mother or
Market? Effects of Maternal Employment on the Intellectual Ability of 4-Year-
Old Children." Demography 26 (4): 545-561.
Devaney, Barbara, Linda Bilheimer, and Jennifer Schore (1990). The Savings in
Medicaid Costs for Newborns and Their Mothers from Prenatal Participation in the
WIC Program. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research, Inc.
Pamela Haines, and Robert Moffitt (1989). Assessing the Dietary Effects of
the Food Stamp Program, Volume 2: Empirical Results. Project Nos. 7665-450 and
7665-710. Washington, DC: Mathematica Policy Research Inc.
Eliwood, David, and Mary Jo Bane (1985). "The Impact of AFDC on Family
Structure and Living Arrangements." In Research in Labor Economics, 7, pp.
137-207. R. Ehrenberg, ed. Greenwich: JAI Press.
Ensminger, Margaret, and Anita Slusarcick (1992). "Paths to High School Grad-
uation or Dropout: A Longitudinal Study of a 1st Grade Cohort." Sociology of
Education 65: 95-113.
Fraker, Thomas (1990a). Analyses of the 1985 Continuing Survey of Food Intakes by
Individuals, Volume lIEstimating the Effects of the WIC and Food Stamp Programs
on Dietary Intake by Women and Young Children. Washington, DC: USDA Food
and Nutrition Service.
(1990b). The Effects of Food Stamps on Food Consumption: A Review of the
Literature, Washington, DC: USDA Food and Nutrition Service.
Gottschalk, Peter (1990). "AFDC Participation across Generations." The American
Economic Review 80 (2): 367-371.
Hannan, Michael, and Nancy Tuma (1990). "A Reassessment of the Effect of
Income Maintenance on Marital Dissolution in the Seattle-Denver Experi-
ment." American Journal of Sociology 95 (5): 1270-1298.
Hanes, S., J. Vermeersch, and S. Gale (1984). "The National Evaluation of School
Nutrition Programs: Program Impact on Dietary Intake." The American Journal
of Clinical Nutrition 40: 390-413.
Hardle, W. (1990). Applied Non parametric Regression. New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.Welfare and the Well-Being of Children41
Head Start Bureau (1992). Head Start Program Performance Standards. U.S. Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services Publication No. ACF 92-31131.
Hicks, Lou, Rose Langham, and Jean Takenaka (1982). "Cognitive and Health
Measures Following Early Nutritional Supplementation: A Sibling Study."
American Journal of Public Health 72: 1110-1118.
Hill, Anne, and June O'Neill (1992). "The Transmission of Cognitive Achieve-
ment Across Three Generations." Mimeo. Baruch College City University of
New York.
Horbar, Jeffrey, Elizabeth Wright, and Lynn Onstad (1993). "Decreasing Mortal-
ity Associated with the Introduction of Surfactant Therapy: An Observational
Study of Neonates Weighing 601 to 1300 Grams at Birth." Pediatrics 82 (2):
191-196.
Institute of Medicine (1985). Preventing Low Birthweight, Washington, DC: Na-
tional Academy Press.
Johnson, Gary (1986). "Rent Paying Ability and Racial Settlement Patterns: A
Review and Analysis of Recent Housing Allowance Evidence." American Jour-
nal of Economics and Sociology 45 (1): 17-26.
Jones, Jean Yavis (1992). "The WIC Program: Eligibility, Coverage, and Fund-
ing." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
(1990). "Child Nutrition: Program Information, Funding, and Participa-
tion FY 1980-FY 1990." Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service.
Kehrer, Barbara, and Charles Wolin (1979). "Impact of Income Maintenance on
Low Birth Weight: Evidence from the Gary Experiment." The Journal of Human
Resources 14 (4): 434-462.
Kennedy, Stephen, and Merly Finkel (1987). Report of First Year Findings for the Free-
standing Housing Voucher Demonstration. Cambridge, MA: ABT Associates, Inc.
Korenman, Sanders, and Jane Miller (1992). Food Stamp Program Participation and
Maternal and Child Health. Draft Report to the Food and Nutrition Service of the
United States Department of Agriculture.
Lazere, Edward, Paul Leanard, Cushing Dolbeare, and Barry Zigas (1991, De-
cember). A Place to Call Home: The Low Income Housing Crisis Continues. Washing-
ton, DC: The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.
Mallar, Charles (1977). "The Educational and Labor Supply Responses of Young
Adults on the Urban Graduated Work Incentive Experiment." In The New
Jersey Income Maintenance Experiments. Harold Watts and Albert Rees, eds. New
York: Academic Press.
Massachusetts Department of Health, Division of Family Services (1983). 1983
Massachusetts Nutrition Survey. Boston: Department of Health.
Maynard, Rebecca, and David Crawford (1976). "School Performance." Rural
Income Maintenance Experiment: Final Report. Madison, WI: Institute for Re-
search on Poverty.
,and Richard Murnane (1979). "The Effects of a Negative Income Tax on
School Performance: Results of an Experiment." The Journal of Human Resources
14(4).
McKey, Ruth, et al. (1985). The Impact of Head Start on Children, Families and
Communities: Final Report of the Head Start Evaluation, Synthesis and Utilization
Project. Washington, DC: CSR, Incorporated.
Metcoff, Jack, et al. (1985). "Effect of Food Supplementation (WIC) During Preg-
nancy on Birth Weight." The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 41.42Currie
Meyers, Alan, Amy Sampson, Michael Weitzman, and Herb Kayne (1989).
"School Breakfast Program and School Performance." American Journal of Dis-
eases of Children 143 (N10): 1234-1239.
Dana Rubin, Maria Napoleone, and Kevin Nichols (1993). "Public Hous-
ing Subsidies May Improve Poor Children's Nutrition." American Journal of
Public Health 83 (1): 115.
Michael, Robert (1978). "The Consumption Studies." In Welfare in Rural Areas:
The Iowa Income Maintenance Experiment. John Palmer and Joseph Pechman,
eds. The Brookings Institution: Washington, DC.
Mitchell, Janet, and Rachel Shurman (1984). "Access to Private Obstetrics!
Gynecology Services Under Medicaid." Medical Care 22: 1026-1037.
Moffitt, Robert (1992). "Incentive Effects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review."
Journal of Economic Literature 30: 1-61.
(1989). "Estimating the Value of an In-Kind Transfer: The Case of Food
Stamps." Econometrica 57 (2): 385-410.
Moore, Kristin, and Steven Caidwell (1977). "The Effect of Government Policies
on Out-of-Wedlock Sex and Pregnancy." Family Planning Perspectives 9 (4): 164-
169.
Muiroy, Elizabeth (1988). "The Search for Affordable Housing." In Women as
Single Parents: Confronting the Institutional Barriers in the Courts, the Workplace and
the Housing Market. E. Mulroy, ed. New York: Auburn House.
Murray, Charles (1984). Losing Ground. New York: Basic Books.
Newhouse, Joseph (1992). "Medical Care Costs: How Much Welfare Loss?" Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 6 (3): 3-22.
Nichols, Albert, and Richard Zeckhauser (1982). "Targeting Transfers through
Restrictions on Recipients" American Economic Review 72(2): 372-377.
O'Conner, Frank, Patrick Madden, and Allen Pringle (1976). "Nutrition." Rural
Income Maintenance Experiment: Final Report. Madison, WI: Institute for Re-
search on Poverty.
Pedone, Carla (1988). Current Housing Problems and Possible Federal Responses,
Washington, DC: Congressional Budget Office.
Radzikowski, Jack, and Steven Gale (1984a). "The National Evaluation of School
Nutrition Programs: Conclusions." The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 40:
454-461.
(1984b). "Requirement for the National Evaluation of School Nutrition
Programs." The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 40: 365-367.
Robins, Philip (1985). "A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the
Four Negative Income Tax Experiments." Journal of Human Resources, 20 (4):
567-582.
Rosenbaum, James (1992). "Black Pioneers-Do Their Moves to the Suburbs
Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children?" Housing Policy
Debate 2 (4): 1179-1213.
,L. S. Rubinowitz, and M. J. Kulieke (1986). Low Income African-American
Children in White Suburban Schools. Evanston, IL: Center for Urban Affairs and
Policy Research, Northwestern University.
Schramm, Wayne (1985). "WIC Prenatal Participation and Its Relationship to
Newborn Medicaid Costs in Missouri: A Cost/Benefit Analysis." American Jour-
nal of Public Health, 75 (8).
Starfield, Barbara (1985). Effectiveness of Medical Care: Validating Clinical Wisdom.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Welfare and the Well-Being of Children43
Stewart, Anne (1992). Head Start: Funding Eligibility and Participation. Washing-
ton, DC. CRS Report for Congress.
Thomas, Duncan (in press). "Like Father Like Son, Or, Like Mother Like Daugh-
ter: Parental Education and Child Health." Journal of Human Resources.
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control,
Public Health Service (1978). CDC Analysis of Nutritional Indices for Selected WIC
Participants. FNS-176.
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means (1992). Overview
of Entitlement Programs: 1992 Green Book. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office.
(1991). 1991 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs within
the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. WMCP-102-9. Washington,
DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Venti, Steven (1984). "The Effects of Income Maintenance on Work, Schooling,
and Non-Market Activities of Youth." Review of Economics and Statistics 66 (1):
16-25.
Zimmerman, David, and Phillip Levine (1993). "The Intergenerational Correla-
tion in AFDC Participation: Welfare Trap or Poverty Trap." Mimeo. Williams
College.